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CANADA’s TOP COURT 
SANCTIONS POLICE SAFETY 
SEARCH 
R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52 
 
The police, responding to 
information of a break and 
enter in progress, found the 
accused, who matched the 
suspect description, walking on a sidewalk close 
to the scene. The attending officers stopped the 
accused to question him and conducted a 
“security search” by patting him down, looking 
for items that may be used as weapons. In the 
front pouch of his pullover sweater, the officer 
detected, by touch, something soft. The officer 
then went inside the pouch and found a baggie of 
marihuana. The officer testified that the soft 
item might be concealing something hard like a 
weapon behind it, and he was not about to stop 
his protective search for this reason1.  
 
At trial the accused was acquitted because the 
judge concluded that the officer had no reason 
other than perhaps curiosity to go beyond the 
external pat down search when he felt something 
soft. Thus, the search was unreasonable and the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. On appeal by the Crown, the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and 
ordered a new trial.  Using the two-prong 
analysis of the Waterfield test (a legal analysis 
for determining the common law powers of the 
police), the Court concluded the police were 
justified in both detaining as well as searching 
the accused.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See R. v. Mann, 2002 MBCA 121 
 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which allowed the appeal and reinstated 
the acquittal by holding the evidence 
inadmissible. Despite agreeing with the trial 
court on the issue of admissibility, Canada’s 
highest Court outlined some important general 
principles regarding investigative detention and 
the accompanying authority to search detainees. 
In this case, the court examined under what 
circumstances and to what extent the police can 
interfere with an individual’s freedom to be left 
alone by the state. 
 
Investigative Detention 
 
Justice Iacobucci, writing the majority 
judgment, examined a number of cases that 
recognized the limited power of police officers 
to detain persons for investigative purposes.  At 
minimum, the police must have reasonable 
grounds to detain (also known as articulable 
cause). This standard (reasonable grounds to 
detain) is “somewhat lower than the reasonable 
and probable grounds for lawful arrest” and 
imports both an objective and subjective 
standard.  Justice Iacobucci wrote: 
 
The case law raises several guiding principles 
governing the use of a police power to detain 
for investigative purposes. The evolution of 
the Waterfield test, along with the Simpson 
articulable cause requirement, calls for 
investigative detentions to be premised upon 
reasonable grounds. The detention must be 
viewed as reasonably necessary on an objective 
view of the totality of the circumstances, 
informing the officer's suspicion that there is 
a clear nexus between the individual to be 
detained and a recent or on-going criminal 
offence. Reasonable grounds figures at the  
 2            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 4 
  July/August 2004 
front-end of such an assessment, underlying 
the officer's reasonable suspicion that the 
particular individual is implicated in the 
criminal activity under investigation. The 
overall reasonableness of the decision to 
detain, however, must further be assessed 
against all of the circumstances, most notably 
the extent to which the interference with 
individual liberty is necessary to perform the 
officer's duty, the liberty interfered with, 
and the nature and extent of that 
interference, in order to meet the second 
prong of the Waterfield test. 
 
Police powers and police duties are not 
necessarily correlative. While the police have a 
common law duty to investigate crime, they are 
not empowered to undertake any and all action 
in the exercise of that duty. Individual liberty 
interests are fundamental to the Canadian 
constitutional order. Consequently, any 
intrusion upon them must not be taken lightly 
and, as a result, police officers do not have 
carte blanche to detain. The power to detain 
cannot be exercised on the basis of a hunch, 
nor can it become a de facto arrest. [paras. 
34-35] 
 
Thus, the police must possess a reasonable 
suspicion (more than a hunch) the detainee is 
involved in ongoing criminal activity and that such 
a detention is necessary in the circumstances. 
 
Protective Searching 
 
The court recognized the need to balance the 
competing interests of police safety and 
individual privacy interests in assessing whether 
the search of a detainee is justified. Justice 
Iacobucci concluded that the common law does 
provide the power to search incidental to an 
investigative detention as long as the search is 
reasonably necessary in the circumstances for 
safety reasons—not to find evidence of a crime. 
And once again, the police must have more than a 
hunch that their safety is at risk.  However, the 
level of risk (low to high) required to engage a 
safety search is unclear. The majority held: 
 
The general duty of officers to protect life 
may, in some circumstances, give rise to the 
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power to conduct a pat-down search incident 
to an investigative detention. Such a search 
power does not exist as a matter of course; 
the officer must believe on reasonable grounds 
that his or her own safety, or the safety of 
others, is at risk. I disagree with the 
suggestion that the power to detain for 
investigative searches endorses an incidental 
search in all circumstances...The officer's 
decision to search must also be reasonably 
necessary in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. It cannot be justified on the 
basis of a vague or non-existent concern for 
safety, nor can the search be premised upon 
hunches or mere intuition. [para. 40] 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the majority ruled: 
 
To summarize…police officers may detain an 
individual for investigative purposes if there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the 
circumstances that the individual is connected 
to a particular crime and that such a detention 
is necessary. In addition, where a police 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that 
his or her safety or that of others is at risk, 
the officer may engage in a protective pat-
down search of the detained individual. Both 
the detention and the pat-down search must 
be conducted in a reasonable manner. In this 
connection, I note that the investigative 
detention should be brief in duration and does 
not impose an obligation on the detained 
individual to answer questions posed by the 
police. The investigative detention and 
protective search power are to be 
distinguished from an arrest and the incidental 
power to search on arrest, which do not arise 
in this case. [emphasis added, para. 45] 
 
In this case, the police did have reasonable 
grounds to suspect the accused was involved in 
criminal activity. He closely matched the break 
and enter suspect description and was only two 
to three blocks from the crime scene.  A 
protective search of the accused was also 
reasonable. As the majority noted: 
 
There was a logical possibility that the 
[accused], suspected on reasonable grounds of 
having recently committed a break-and-enter, 
was in possession of break-and enter-tools, 
which could be used as weapons. The encounter 
also occurred just after midnight and there 
was no other people in the area. On balance, 
the officer was justified in conducting a pat-
down search for protective purposes. [para. 
48] 
 
However, the officer’s decision to reach into the 
accused’s pocket after feeling a soft object 
went beyond a protective pat-down. The accused 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
pocket and the police unreasonably violated this 
privacy expectation—a s.8 Charter violation. 
Once the officer reached into the accused’s 
pocket the search shifted from safety concerns 
to the detection and collection of evidence. The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal should have given due 
deference to this finding by the trial judge.  
 
Admissibility of the Evidence 
 
Although all seven of the Supreme Court justices 
agreed that the search was a s.8 Charter 
(unreasonable search or seizure) violation, they 
were divided on the admissibility of the 
evidence. The majority (five justices) concluded 
the evidence was inadmissible under s.24(2). 
Although the evidence was non conscriptive, the 
breach was “unacceptably serious”. Moreover, 
“the nature of the fundamental rights at issue, 
and the lack of a reasonable foundation for the 
search suggest that the inclusion of the 
evidence would adversely affect the 
administration of justice”. The majority allowed 
the appeal and restored the accused’s acquittal.  
 
The minority, on the other hand, would have 
ruled the evidence admissible. In their view, the 
admission of the evidence would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
There can be no justice until those who are 
unaffected by crime become as indignant as 
those who are…—Solon 635-588 B.C. 
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ESSENTIAL COP COURSE 
JUSTIFIES COURT 
ADJOURNMENT 
R. v. Tkachuk, 2004 ABQB 266 
 
The Crown made an application, 
opposed by defence counsel, to 
adjourn the accused’s two day 
cocaine trafficking trial 
because the undercover constable was attending 
a specialized drug course during the trial dates. 
It was submitted by Crown that it was important 
for the officer to take the course because he 
was only one of two experts in the Edmonton 
region who could testify locally. Defence counsel, 
on the other hand, argued the Crown should be 
forced to choose between the officer taking the 
course (if it was more important) and the 
prosecution of the accused.  
 
Justice Lee of the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
bench sided with the Crown. In his view, there 
was no inordinate delay in this case—it was about 
one year old, this was the first adjournment 
application, and the officer was available for the 
new proposed trial dates. He stated: 
 
It is unfortunate that the undercover police 
officer has to attend a course, but I am 
satisfied that this course is essential for his 
work. Normally police officers would not be 
excused from testifying because they have to 
attend courses, but given that the constable in 
this case is only one of two expert drug 
trafficking witnesses available to the Crown, 
his attendance on the course is reasonable and 
justified. [para.9] 
 
And further: 
 
While it is unfortunate that the constable is 
on a course at the same time as the trial is 
scheduled, the course is important relative to 
the constable’s duties as he is one of only two 
experts available presently with respect to the 
local drug trade. Therefore his attendance at 
the course is reasonable, even if it does not 
relate to his role in the present trial, and even 
is it causes a slight delay in the trial. [para. 15] 
The adjournment application was granted. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
CRIMINAL HARASSMENT: 
‘REPEATEDLY’ MEANS MORE 
THAN SINGLE INCIDENT 
R. v. Zeilstra, 2004 BCSC 648 
 
The accused was convicted in 
British Columbia Provincial 
Court of criminal harassment 
under s.264 of the Criminal 
Code after his ex-common law 
wife reported that he followed her in his vehicle 
for 30-35 minutes, during which both vehicles 
exceeded the speed limit. The two had earlier 
lived together for six to eight months and had 
joint custody of their 13 month old child. The 
accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court arguing, in part, that Crown 
failed to prove that he harassed the 
complainant. 
 
Section 264(2) outlines four types of prohibited 
conduct that must be proven in order to sustain 
a conviction, including “repeatedly following from 
place to place the other person or anyone known 
to them.” The only evidence was the single 
occasion when the accused followed the 
complainant. Repeatedly, on the other hand, 
means conduct which goes beyond one occasion. 
Thus, the accused’s conviction could not be 
supported in law. The appeal was allowed and an 
acquittal was entered.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
IT’S WHAT THE OFFICER 
KNOWS THAT COUNTS 
R. v. Decker, 2004 NLCA 36 
 
A police officer received 
information by telephone from 
another officer that he had seen 
a person drinking liquor in a dark 
coloured pickup located at a 
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ferry terminal. The officer receiving the 
information went to the ferry terminal and 
stopped a pickup with two occupants. There was 
only one road into and out of the terminal area 
and traffic was light. A roadside test was 
administered and the accused failed. He 
subsequently provided two breath samples in 
excess of the legal limit and was charged. 
 
At his trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court, the 
accused was convicted of care and control with a 
blood alcohol level over 80mg%. The trial judge 
concluded the accused’s rights under s.9 of the 
Charter protecting him from arbitrary detention 
had not been breached and there was no reason 
to exclude the certificate of analysis. The 
accused appealed to the Newfoundland Supreme 
Court.  
 
In overturning the conviction, Justice Dymond 
found the accused had been arbitrarily detained 
because the police lacked an articulable cause 
for the stop. In his view, the detaining officer 
had no objective observation of an offence or 
erratic driving. Rather, he only had minimal 
information provided by another officer—the 
vehicle’s licence number, make, model, colour, 
occupant description, or whether it was parked 
or moving were not known.  As a result of the 
unlawful detention—described as random and 
arbitrary by Justice Dymond—the evidence of 
the breathalyzer readings was excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal arguing the description of the vehicle 
was sufficiently detained to provide articulable 
cause—the yardstick used to measure an 
arbitrary detention under s.9. Articulable cause 
has been previously described by the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal as “a 
demonstrable rationale…which is sufficiently 
reasonable to have justified the detention”2. 
 
Justice Welsh, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, noted there were two important 
                                                 
2 R. v. Burke, 1997, 153 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91 (NCA).  
 
considerations in assessing articulable cause. 
First, the particular context of the situation 
must be considered. And second, “the focus must 
be on the evidence that is before the court, not 
the factors that, had they been present, may 
have facilitated proving articulable cause”. In 
this case, the lower appeal court judge erred 
when he focused on what factors the officer did 
not have. In holding there was sufficient cause 
to justify the stop, Justice Burke of 
Newfoundland’s top court stated: 
 
In this case, the vehicle matched the 
description of the vehicle [the officer] was 
looking for, a dark pickup with two occupants. 
There was just one road on which the vehicle 
could be traveling, and only one possible 
direction since the driver was leaving the 
ferry terminal, Further, [the officer] stopped 
the [the accused’s] vehicle at a time there was 
very little traffic…. 
 
The testimony as to the volume of traffic is 
important in light of the limited description of 
the vehicle provided…. In the particular 
circumstances of this case, it cannot be said 
that [the officer] stopped the [accused’s] 
vehicle randomly or arbitrarily. He used 
objective criteria to identify the vehicle. He 
had reasonable grounds, which he could 
articulate, for stopping the particular vehicle. 
While the amount of information was minimal, 
it was sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of section 9 of the Charter. [paras. 12 and 13] 
 
In other words, in assessing articulable cause, 
the appropriate focus is on the known—rather 
that the unknown. The appeal was allowed and 
the conviction was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org. 
 
ABBOTSFORD POLICE 
14th ANNUAL 
10K CHALLENGE/5K FUN RUN 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2004 
 
Log onto 
www.abbotsfordpolice.org 
for more details. 
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HOUSE SEARCH WARRANT 
DOES NOT INCLUDE VEHICLE 
PARKED ON PROPERTY 
R. v. Vu, 2004 BCCA 230 
 
Police received a tip of a possible 
marihuana grow operation at a 
residence. Follow-up 
investigation was conducted and 
a search warrant was obtained 
and executed. In the home, police found 127 
plants, an elaborate ventilation system, lights, a 
tampered hydro meter and other evidence. Also 
found in the search were keys, one set fitting 
the locks securing the door to the grow 
operation as well as a vehicle parked in the 
backyard. Police opened the car and found 
documents in the accused’s name, including 
vehicle registration papers, and two passport 
photographs bearing his likeness.  
 
At trial, the accused was convicted of marihuana 
production and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. An officer testified he usually 
examines search warrants, but in this case did 
not and went ahead and searched the vehicle 
anyways. Police also admitted they had searched 
vehicles found at grow operations for offence 
related material in similar circumstances before, 
even though the vehicles were not mentioned in 
the warrants. The trial judge found there had 
been no breach of the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right. Furthermore, even if there was a breach, 
the trial judge would have admitted the evidence 
under s.24(2). In her view, the officers acted in 
good faith, having had reasonable grounds to 
search the vehicle. The accused appealed to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, among 
other grounds, that the search of the vehicle 
was unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter and 
that the evidence should have been excluded.  
 
The Search 
 
All three appeal court justices agreed that the 
search of the vehicle under the warrant 
authorizing the search of the dwelling house did 
not include the authority to search vehicles on 
the property.  Thus, the accused’s right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
was violated. Justice Donald held: 
 
On the face of the warrant I do not, with 
respect, see how it is possible to find that it 
authorized the search of a motor vehicle. The 
warrant recites that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that evidence of an offence 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act are "in a place, namely the dwelling 
house...". The authority is "to enter the said 
place...". The antecedent of place is clearly the 
dwelling house. That language cannot be 
stretched to include a vehicle. 
 
Neither can it be said that the Information to 
Obtain provides a context for giving an 
expansive reading to the warrants such that it 
can include the Honda…. 
 
Thus the search was not authorized by law: 
either by the warrant or by reason of exigent 
circumstances or a search incidental to an 
arrest. The [accused] was not arrested at the 
time of the searches. It must follow in my 
judgment that the search of the vehicle 
violated s. 8. [paras. 20-22] 
 
Good Faith 
 
Section 24(2) of the Charter allows a court to 
consider evidence obtained as a result of a 
Charter violation provided its admission in the 
trial would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. One factor the courts 
examine during the s.24(2) analysis is whether 
the police were acting in good faith when they 
obtained the evidence in question. In this case, 
the trial judge felt the police had reasonable 
grounds to believe vehicles should be searched 
at a grow operations because evidence might be 
found in them. Justice Donald (with Justice 
Rowles concurring) however, disagreed. In the 
majority’s opinion, reasonable grounds to believe 
a vehicle may provide evidence would only offer a 
basis to obtain another warrant, not allow for a 
warrantless search of the vehicle without 
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exigent circumstances or some other power. 
Justice Donald, critical of the police conduct in 
this case, stated: 
 
I have said that reasonable grounds to search 
do not provide a basis for a finding of good 
faith. A warrant is required and every police 
officer should know that. The thinking that 
reasonable grounds constitutes good faith 
must be discouraged, otherwise police will 
shortcut the warrant process in the 
expectation that the evidence obtained in a 
warrantless search will be admitted 
notwithstanding a s. 8 breach. 
 
Not only is the trial judge's finding of good 
faith based on an erroneous ground, but the 
behaviour of the police manifested the 
opposite of good faith. The officer who 
searched the vehicle did not read the warrant 
to see whether it authorized the search. This 
shows a casual indifference to the privacy 
interests protected by s. 8. Both that officer 
and the detective in charge indicated a 
practice of searching vehicles on property 
covered by a warrant despite the absence of 
any specific authority relating to vehicles. An 
occasional lapse is one thing, a practice is quite 
another and engages the good faith criterion 
in the [s.24(2)] analysis. 
 
In my view, the reputation of justice will 
suffer much more from tolerating a practice 
of unauthorized searches than setting aside 
the convictions. The exclusion of the evidence 
taken in the vehicle search would not end the 
matter. On a new trial the Crown may have 
other means of proving the [accused’s] identity 
as a person with knowledge and control of the 
grow operation. [paras. 40-42] 
 
Justice Braidwood took a different position than 
the majority on the good faith issue. He 
concluded that the admission of the evidence 
would not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. In his view the evidence was non-
conscriptive, the violation not serious, and the 
accused’s privacy expectation in the vehicle was 
lower than a residence. The fact the officer who 
searched the vehicle usually examines the search 
warrant, but failed in this case, was evidence of 
carelessness rather than bad faith. Justice 
Braidwood wrote: 
 
This is not a case of the police running 
roughshod over an accused’s rights. The police 
found a large scale marihuana grow operation 
in the house. While the cultivation of a 
narcotic is a very serious offence, the breach 
of the [accused’s] rights was not serious. 
Admitting the evidence would not lessen the 
esteem in which the public holds the 
administration of justice. There is no need in 
this case to acquit the guilty in order to 
ensure that in the future the public’s right to 
privacy is protected; to do so in this case 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. [para. 74] 
 
The accused’s convictions were set aside and a 
new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca  
 
FLIGHT FROM POLICE ADDS 
TO REASONABLE SUSPICION 
R. v. Jackson, 
(2004) Docket: C40604 (Ont.C.A.) 
 
Two plainclothes police officers 
were patrolling an area known for 
drug trafficking and gun related 
incidents shortly after midnight 
when they saw two black males walking along the 
street. They were the only pedestrians in the 
area and were doing nothing suspicious. About 25 
minutes later another officer broadcast over 
the police radio he heard a gunshot in the area. 
The plainclothes officers drove back into the 
area, verbally identified themselves as police, 
and told the two men seen earlier that they 
wanted to talk. The two men fled on foot and the 
police took up chase. One man got away, but the 
accused was apprehended as he attempted to 
scale a fence. As police pulled the accused from 
the fence, an object fell from his jacket and a 
silver handgun was found near his feet on the 
ground. After a struggle, he was pepper sprayed 
and handcuffed. A search of the accused netted 
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police $330 in cash, a baggie of crack cocaine, 
and a baggie of marihuana. He was subsequently 
charged with several offences. 
 
The accused made a motion in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice ([2002] O.J. No. 
4005) to exclude the evidence submitting it was 
obtained as a result of an arbitrary detention 
(s.9 of the Charter) and an unreasonable search 
(s.8 of the Charter). Superior Court Justice 
Nordheimer concluded the police were justified 
in approaching the two men to question them in 
light of the circumstances that evening. This, 
along with the men fleeing, provided sufficient 
cause for the police to pursue and detain them. 
Thus, everything that flowed from the efforts 
to detain the accused—finding the gun, the 
arrest and the search—was admissible. Justice 
Nordheimer stated: 
 
…the officers were patrolling in an area of 
their division which was known for problems, 
including gun related incidents; it was early in 
the morning; they had received a report of a 
gun shot; and the defendant and the other 
male were the only two individuals who the 
officers had seen in the area.  In those 
circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for 
the officers to wish to question the two men in 
relation to the gun report.  In this regard, it is 
important to remember that police officers do 
have the right to question people in 
furtherance of an investigation… 
 
The officers were therefore acting within 
their rights to question the defendant and the 
other male.  Had the defendant simply refused 
to answer the officers' questions, then any 
attempt by the officers to detain or arrest 
the defendant would have been problematic… 
However, that is not what happened.  Rather 
than refusing to answer the officers' 
questions, the defendant and the other male 
fled.  In doing so, in my view, the defendant 
provided the reasonable suspicion to the 
officers necessary for the officers to pursue 
and detain the defendant. The defence 
strongly asserted that the questions raised by 
these evidentiary issues had to primarily be 
determined through the use of common 
sense.  The defence then asserted that if the 
defendant had the right to simply refuse to 
answer questions and walk away, then he had 
the right to run.  I would say that common 
sense does not allow for the conclusion that 
individuals in this situation who attempt to flee 
from police officers are to be treated as 
equivalent to individuals who simply refuse to 
answer questions…. [references omitted, paras. 
12, 13] 
 
And further: 
 
The result of the defence position in these 
circumstances is that the officers would have 
had no alternative in the face of these two 
men fleeing but to simply return to their police 
car and continue on patrol.  That is a result 
that does not accord either with common 
sense or with the requirements of the 
Charter.  Instead, I believe that the 
"constellation of objectively discernible facts" 
gave the officers articulable cause to detain 
the defendant.  That, in turn, gave the 
officers the right to pursue the defendant to 
effect the detention.  In the course of 
detaining the defendant, the firearm was 
revealed, and that, in turn, gave the officers 
the right to arrest the defendant.  The arrest 
being valid, then the warrantless search which 
gave rise to the finding of the drugs is also 
justified. [para. 16] 
 
The accused was convicted by a jury of 
possession of a firearm, assault with intent to 
resist arrest, and failing to comply with a 
recognizance, but appealed to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal contending, among other grounds, that 
the trial judge erred in concluding the detention 
was justified. In dismissing his appeal, the 
unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal agreed “with 
the trial judge that the "constellation of 
objectively discernible facts" including the 
[accused’s] attempt to flee from the police 
provided reasonable grounds for the officers to 
pursue and detain him.”  
 
Complete case available at ww.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Editor’s note: It must be remembered that it 
was not the flight from police, by itself, which 
provided the reasonable suspicion (sometimes 
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referred to as an articulable cause) for the 
accused’s pursuit and detention. Rather, there 
were other circumstances including the 
reputation of the area, a gunshot, and the fact 
the accused was in the area at the time. As well, 
the officers had identified themselves and told 
the accused and his companion they wished to 
speak to them, at which time they ran away. It 
was the totality of the circumstances—not 
taking any one in isolation—that provided 
sufficient cause for the police in this case to 
pursue.  
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that the Police Services, Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General, Province of British 
Columbia recently published 2003 statistics 
reporting the Criminal Code case burdens per 
officer for all 11 of BC’s independent municipal 
police departments?  
 
Department Criminal Code Case Burden 
per Officer 
Abbotsford 97 
Nelson 92 
Victoria 89 
New Westminster 87 
Vancouver 65 
Oak Bay 61 
Port Moody 53 
Delta 51 
Saanich 44 
West Vancouver 44 
Central Saanich 35 
 
In the Data Qualifiers to the report, Police 
Services notes, “Case Burden is defined as the 
number of Criminal Code offences (excluding 
Traffic) per authorized police strength. Because 
it represents the workload per officer in each 
policing jurisdiction, case burden is a better 
indicator of the demand for police services than 
either population or crime rates.” A copy of the 
report is available at www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/police_ 
services. 
 
‘MENACING’ POLICE CONDUCT 
DOES NOT WARRANT STAY 
R. v. McCrea, 2004 BCCA 229 
 
The accused was arrested for 
robbery, taken to the police 
station, and searched. He was 
provided access to a telephone 
to call a lawyer, but the lawyer 
was not in. However, a member of the lawyer’s 
staff connected the accused to his own 
residence where he had a 45-minute 
conversation with someone at his home. Following 
the telephone call, the two officers interviewed 
the accused for three and a half hours. The 
interview was captured on video tape.  
 
Despite the accused maintaining he wished to 
remain silent throughout the interview, the 
officers continued to tell him what they knew 
and urged him to tell his side of the story. At 
one point during the interview the accused was 
seated on a chair. A police officer responded 
aggressively, moved his chair closer to the 
accused so their faces were less than two feet 
apart. The officer then suddenly stood up, 
thrust his hand in the direction of the accused, 
struck the wall behind his head, and leveled an 
insulting, profane, and vulgar verbal barrage at 
him. The officer then left the interview room 
and slammed the door behind him. The accused 
was not touched during the event and appeared 
quite collected afterwards. The second officer 
did not intervene during the incident.  
 
At his trial for break and enter x 17, armed 
robbery x 4, and committing an indictable 
offence while masked x 4, the accused applied 
for a judicial stay of proceedings arguing, in 
part, that he was verbally abused during the 
interview. Even though no evidence derived from 
the interview was tendered at trial, the trial 
judge concluded the police transgression 
affected the judicial process and ordered a 
judicial stay of proceedings. The trial judge 
stated: 
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These actions of the police officers are 
completely unacceptable.  Persons in Canada 
are entitled to be treated with respect and 
dignity by law enforcement individuals, even 
those persons who are charged with serious 
criminal offences.  The actions of the police 
went way beyond what the community expects 
from professional law enforcement persons. To 
be treated by these officers as the accused 
was is an affront to the community’s sense of 
fair play and responsibility by those who are 
charged with a duty to serve and protect. 
……… 
In the case at bar there was no physical injury, 
there nevertheless were serious and flagrant 
violations perpetrated against the accused.  
Taken all together, and most significantly the 
actions of the police officers, lead me to the 
conclusion that this is one of those cases that 
is the clearest of cases where the only way to 
ensure the integrity of the judicial system and 
to remind the police that their behaviour at all 
times when dealing with members of the 
public, including those persons charged or 
suspected with serious crime, must be civilized 
and professional, is to grant a stay of 
proceedings. 
 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal.  Justice Saunders, authoring 
the unanimous appeal court judgment, found a 
stay of proceedings was not appropriate in the 
circumstances. As she noted, “A judicial stay of 
proceedings is the ultimate remedy available to 
an accused, preventing as it does prosecution of 
the charges laid in the public interest.  It is for 
that reason that a stay will be ordered in only 
the “clearest of cases”.” In considering whether 
a stay is appropriate, a court must examine  
 
(1) The impact upon the trial process—
whether the prejudice caused by the 
police behaviour manifested, perpetuated, 
or aggravated the conduct or outcome of a 
trial,  
 
(2) Whether a stay the only remedy or if 
there was any other remedy reasonably 
capable of removing the prejudice, and  
 
(3) Balance the interests served by a stay 
weighed against society’s interest in a final 
decision of the charges.  
 
Although Justice Saunders found the officer’s 
behaviour “below standard” and “menacing”, she 
concluded the trial judge “gave inordinate 
consideration to the disciplinary influence of a 
stay upon the comportment of police officers 
and insufficient consideration” to the above 
three criteria. In reviewing the impact of the 
police behaviour on the trial process, Justice 
Saunders stated: 
 
In the case at bar the incident was separate 
both in time and substance from the 
prosecution of the charges, the misconduct 
occurred prior to involvement of Crown counsel 
or the trial process and the interview provided 
no evidence for use at trial.  This compels the 
conclusion, in my view, that any prejudice to 
the accused caused by the incident is unlikely 
to be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated 
through the continuation of the trial or by a 
verdict. 
 
To put the matter another way, the issue here 
is one of the behaviour of a police officer that 
had no material effect upon the conduct of 
the trial or its outcome.  In that sense the 
stay was directed at least in part, as the trial 
judge appeared to recognize, to the discipline 
of the police service.  However, discipline of 
police, while perhaps a secondary outcome to a 
stay of proceedings, should not be the purpose 
of such an order.  [paras. 19-20] 
 
As for other remedies, the accused’s sentence 
(if convicted) could reflect the inappropriate 
police conduct, the accused could seek a civil 
remedy, or the RCMP public police complaint 
process could be pursued. Finally, “the 
administration of justice would be brought into 
disrepute by a stay of proceedings.” The 
prejudice was “fleeting”, there was no 
substantive effect on the trial, and the charges 
were serious and many. The stay was set aside 
and the matter remitted for trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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VOLUNTARINESS: HOW FAR 
CAN A POLICE 
INTERROGATION GO? 
Henry Waldock, Crown Counsel 
Current police interrogation techniques use 
psychological devices to persuade suspects to 
confess.  To win sympathy for the accused at 
trial, defence counsel will emphasize the 
imbalance of power between the detained 
suspect and the sophisticated cop.3  But the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle4 clearly 
established that not every improper inducement 
renders a statement involuntary.  When a 
suspect has been well treated, it takes 
considerable pressure to overwhelm a person’s 
freedom to choose whether to confess. 
It is trite law that if the suspect spoke to a 
“person in authority”5 about the crime, courts 
will accept evidence of those remarks only if the 
accused made them voluntarily. 
A suspect makes a statement voluntarily when: 
¾ the suspect had an operating mind; 
¾ the person in authority did not use threats 
or promises nor oppression to persuade; 
the suspect to speak; 
¾ the suspect is not compelled to speak; and 
¾ the police did not use improper trickery 
“If an investigator’s conduct passes the scrutiny 
of the common law rule as to voluntariness, it 
necessarily satisfies the Charter right to 
silence.”6 
 
What Caused the Confession? 
When describing the principles of voluntariness, 
Iaccobucci J. did not discuss causation.  But 
when applying the principles to facts, he 
dismissed many inducements as being 
insufficient to cause Oickle to confess 
                                                 
3 For example: Baidwan #2 March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry 
#CC001678A at para 51. 
4 R. v. Oickle 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, (2000) 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 
5 A person in authority is someone who investigates, detains, arrests or 
prosecutes the accused..  See: R. v. Hodgson [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 
449 and R. v. Wells [1998] 2 S.C.R. 517, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 500. 
6 HMTQ v. Baidwan No. 1, 2001 BCSC 1412 at para 56; aff’d 2003 BCCA 351 
involuntarily.7  Other cases put this in more 
express terms.8  Therefore, even where the 
police have offered inducements, or oppressed 
or tricked the suspect, Crown counsel should ask 
the court to determine whether these things 
overwhelmed the suspect’s will.9 
 
Operating Mind 
The operating mind standard is a low one – 
schizophrenia,10 drunkenness11 and other mental 
problems12 do not necessarily render a statement 
involuntary.  But a low mental capacity renders a 
suspect more vulnerable to oppression, and so 
the court may give greater scrutiny to the 
treatment of the suspect.13 
 
Threats or Promises 
 
Proper Improper 
Minimize Moral 
Gravity of Offence14 
Minimize Legal Gravity of 
Offence15 
Appeal to spirituality  
– how do you face your 
God?16 
Discuss how confession will 
impress the judge17 
Social appeal – others 
will respect you 
Discuss sentencing options18 
                                                 
7 R. v. Oickle para 84, 87, 99 
8 R. v. Spencer 2003 BCSC 508 at para 30; R. v. Bakker 2003 BCSC 599 at para 
95; R. v. Crockett 2002 BCCA 658 (2002) 170 C.C.C. (3d) 569,  (2002) 7 C.R. (6th) 
300 at para 29;  R. v. Paternak (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 452 (Alta. C.A.); Kerans J.A. 
of the Alberta Court of Appeal in  at p. 461 (reversed on other grounds, 110 C.C.C. 
(3d) 382 (S.C.C.)) wrote: 
“For an otherwise healthy and mature human to be deprived of an effective 
choice, I am inclined of the view that the influence must be so overbearing that it 
can be said that the detainee has lost any meaningful independent ability to 
choose to remain silent, and has become a mere tool in the hands of the police.” 
9 R. v. Carpenter 2001 BCCA 31, (2001) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 205 at para 69; R. v. Malik, 
Bagri & Reyat 2003 BCSC 20 at para 69; R. v. Labbe 2002 BCSC 996 (appeal 
allowed on other grounds: (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (BCCA)) at para 37 
10 Whittle [1994] 2 SCR 914, 92 CCC (3d) 11 
11 R. v. Oldham (1970) 1 C.C.C. (2d) 141 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. McKenna [1961] 1 S.C.R. 
660; R. v. Richard (1980) 56 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (BCCA), R. v. Labbe 2002 BCSC 996 
(appeal allowed on other grounds: (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (BCCA)) 
12 R. v. Santinon 11 C.C.C. (2d) 121 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Nagotcha [1980] 1 S.C.R. 714 51 
CCC (2d) 353. 
13 Oickle paragraph 42. 
14 R. v. Speidel 2003 BCSC 1532; R. v. Bakker 2003 BCSC 599;  
15 In some interrogations, the investigating officer referred to less serious legal 
consequences in circumstances in which the suspect may have made the link.  Eg 
Oickle; Baidwan unreported March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry 
#CC001678A;  
16 R. v. MacNeil (1995), 138 N.S.R. (2d) 117 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada refused September 14, 1995 
17 Oblique references to legal process while minimizing moral gravity do not 
necessarily constitute improper inducements.  HMTQ v. Baidwan No. 1, 2001 BCSC 
1412 at para 53; aff’d 2003 BCCA 351 
18 R. v. Warren (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 418 (N.W.T.C.A.) Leave to appeal refused 
[1997] S.C.C.A. No. 483.   When trying to persuade Warren to confess, the 
officer said: If he confessed, apologized and explained that the blast was not 
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Emotional appeal – you 
will feel better 
Phrases like “It would be 
better if you told” or  
“better tell us everything”19 
Develop suspect’s 
trust20 
Intimidate 
Comfort the suspect 
when crying or upset 
Offer quid pro quo – “if you 
confess for me then 
I/prosecutor/judge will do X 
for you” 
Polygraph21 Link confession to liberty 
 
The worst inducement in this category is the 
offer of lenient legal treatment in exchange for 
a confession or the threat of worse treatment 
for failure to confess.  But other improper 
inducements include promises of benefits for 
people close to the suspect22, or psychological 
treatment for the suspect in exchange for a 
confession23.  However, when a suspect infers an 
advantage from a remark made by a police 
officer some trial courts24 diverge from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s distinction between 
inducements by the state and self-inducement.25 
 
Oppression 
Because a suspect might falsely confess made in 
order to put an end to harsh circumstances,26 
Oickle considers oppression.  Again, none of 
these are necessarily fatal, depending upon what 
persuades the offender to confess. 
 
                                                                              
intended to kill the miners, he would be looking at a manslaughter charge and 
might only serve a few years; but if  he did not confess and apologize, he would be 
viewed as a cold, uncaring person and would be treated more harshly by the police 
and the prosecutors' office.  The trial judge was satisfied by the evidence that 
these inducements did not move Warren to give the confession. 
19 R. v. Hogben [1993] B.C.J. No. 458 (BCCA)  
20 R. v. Malik, Bagri & Reyat 2003 BCSC 20 
21 R v. McIntosh (1999) 141 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont CA) leave to appeal dismissed 
[2000] S.C.C.A. No. 81. 
22 R. v. Jackson (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 35 (B.C.C.A.) ; But not all such promises will 
render a confession involuntary: R. v. Billings 2004 BCSC 456. 
23 A promise to get the guy help may cause him to confess.  If so, the statement 
is inadmissible.  But R. v. Ewert (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (B.C.C.A.) decided to 
confess for other reasons, and so the offer didn’t render the statement 
involuntary. 
24  eg R. v. N.T.A. 2002 BCCA 103. 
25 Oickle at para 57; see also R. v. Henri, [2001] A.J. No. 462 (Q.B.);  R. v. 
Carpenter 2001 BCCA 31, (2001) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 205; 
26 Hoilett (1999 Ont CA) Sex offender was drunk and high.  Arrested at 11:25pm.  
Clothing taken for forensic purposes.  Naked for 1.5 hours.  Given a bunny suit.  
Woken at 3:00am for an interview.  Fell asleep 5 times during the interview.  
Confession not voluntary 
 
Proper Dangerous 
Attend the offender’s 
wellbeing 
Deprive suspect of 
sleep27 
Persist in the face of 
assertions of the right to 
silence28 
Withhold medical 
attention 
Let the suspect take 
bathroom breaks 
Threaten or inflict injury 
to suspect29 
Cigarette breaks Confront suspect with 
false evidence30 
Feed the hungry, clothe 
the naked 
Starve or freeze the 
suspect31 
Limit repeated access to 
counsel32 
Deny access to counsel33 
Confront with evidence or 
exaggerate evidence34 
False evidence35 
 Failure to give the right 
to silence warning36 
 
                                                 
27 Baidwan #1 & #2: Unreported ?? March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry 
#CC001678A. 
28 Wood (1994) 94 CCC (3d )193 (NSCA) leave to appeal to SCC dismissed; R. v. 
Bohnet 2003 ABCA 207. R. v. Timm (1998) 131 CCC (3d) 306 (Que CA); R. v. Van 
Haarlem (1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 543 (BCCA) (affirmed 71 C.C.C. (3d) 448 (S.C.C.))  
reviewed the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hebert, and summarized the 
conclusions of that court on the parameters of the right to silence, at page 11: 
…I extract the following principles which are applicable to an accused person's 
fundamental right to silence.  
(1) The right is intended to protect an accused from unfair pre-trial 
interrogation.  
(2) The right is to be determined objectively, based on the conduct of the police.  
(3) Unlike the right to counsel, the right to silence is not an absolute right 
subject only to be discharged by waiver, as was decided in R. v. Clarkson (1986), 
25 C.C.C. (3d) 207, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 493, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383.  
(4) If an accused chooses to volunteer information to policemen, there is no 
violation of his s. 7 right to silence.  
(5) An accused's right to silence will be violated where police conduct subverts 
his constitutional right to choose not to make a statement.  
(6) An accused's right to silence will be violated when undercover police, or their 
agents, actively elicit information after an accused has exercised his right to 
silence. However, in this latter situation, in the absence of eliciting behaviour, if 
an accused chooses to speak by his own choice there is no violation. 
29 R. v. Sabri [2002] O.J. No 2202, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 179 (Ont CA) 
30 R. v. McMillan [2003] O.J. No. 3489 (Ont CA)– officer produces a forged 
“confession” of McMillan’s partner in crime.  McMillan spills the beans.  Crown 
prohibited from cross-examining McMillan on the statement to police. 
31 R. v. Hoilett (1999) 136 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont C.A.)  Consider also that Oickle was 
interrogated late into the night, and again early in the morning. 
32 Uppal Mann & Soomel 2002 BCSC 1379; R. v. Taylor, [1994] B.C.J. No 2112 
(S.C.) (Vol. 2, Tab 12), R. v. Robinson, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1845 (S.C.) (Vol. 3, Tab 
23), and R. v. Ertmoed, [2002] B.C.S.C. 806, R. v. Ekman  2000 BCCA 414 146 CCC 
(3d) 346 para 25; R. v. Roper (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 204 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Gormley 
(1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 110 (P.E.I.S.C. App. Div.); R. v. Mayo (1999) 133 CCC 3d 168 
(Ont CA)  
33 R. v. Freisen 2003 BCSC 1760; R. v. P.L.R (1988) 44 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (N.S.C.A.) 
34 R. v. Watts 2003 BCSC 1403; R. v. Riley & Henry 2001 BCSC 1169 (Romilly J.) 
aff’d (2003) 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (BCCA); Baidwan #1 2001 BCSC 1412 aff’d 2003 
BCCA 351 
35 R. v. Riley & Henry 2001 BCSC 1169 (Romilly J.) aff’d (2003) 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 
(BCCA) 
36 R. v. Boudreau [1949] S.C.R. 262; See also R. v. Dupuis [1952] 2 S.C.R. 516. 
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Trickery 
 
“[T]he investigation of crime and the detection 
of criminals is not a game to be governed by the 
Marquess of Queensbury rules. The authorities, 
in dealing with shrewd and often sophisticated 
criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort 
to tricks or other forms of deceit and should 
not through the rule be hampered in their work. 
What should be repressed vigorously is conduct 
on their part that shocks the community. 
[Emphasis added.]”37 
The sorts of “trickery” that the Supreme Court 
of Canada disapproved of included injecting a 
diabetic with truth serum instead of insulin, or 
pretending to be a priest in order to get a 
confession.  Trickery which brought the justice 
system into disrepute is to be avoided. 
The Crown’s Burden 
Voluntariness is a question of fact; appellate 
courts must defer to the trial judge’s findings.38  
Voluntariness must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; a court may still point at a 
minor inducement and declare a statement to be 
involuntary.39 
Severance – removing offending portions 
If the court does find that police conduct at 
some point did render the suspect’s remarks 
involuntary, ask the court to admit as voluntary 
all conversation which preceded that point.  
However, the whole of the admissible statement 
must go before the trier of fact, not just the 
inculpatory portions.40 
                                                 
37 Oickle at paragraph 66 
38 Oickle para 22; R. v. Tessier 2002 SCC 6 reversing R. v.. Tessier (2001), 153 
C.C.C. (3d) 361 (NBCA) 
39 R. v. Bunn 2001 MBCA 12: “Obviously, having regard to the first sentence of 
the passage I have just quoted, the final sentence must be qualified by the need 
for the Crown to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused's belief in the 
advantage to be gained by a confession was not induced or confirmed by persons 
in authority. There is thus no onus on the accused to prove that his or her 
confession was induced by a promise or that he or she was misled. It is sufficient 
to exclude the statement that the accused believed it would be to his or her 
advantage to make the statement and there is a reasonable doubt as to whether 
this belief was the result of an inducement held out by the police.” 
40 R. v. Allison (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 375 (B.C.C.A.) 
Conclusion 
 
A confession following interrogation may be found 
admissible, no matter how many errors the police 
make if the police errors individually and 
collectively did not overwhelm the suspect’s 
ability to choose whether to confess.  It is a 
question of fact, where advocacy matters. 
 
Further Reading 
Like Oickle, lengthy and intense interrogations 
were conducted in the following cases, yet the 
confessions obtained were admitted: 
 
• HMTQ v. Baidwan #1 - 2001 BCSC 1412 aff’d 2003 
BCCA 351; #2 11 March 2002, Vancouver 
CC001678A. 
• R. v. Ekman (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 346 (B.C.C.A.), 
2000 BCCA 414, 2003 BCCA 485 
• R. v. Ertmoed , 2002 BCSC 806. 
• Wood (1994) 94 CCC (3d )193 (NSCA) leave to 
appeal to SCC dismissed 
 
POLICE ENTRY JUSTIFIED 
FOLLOWING 911 CALL FROM 
PAYPHONE 
R. v. Huang & Zeng, 2004 BCPC 172 
 
Police received a 911 call at 1:57 
am from a payphone located 
outside a convenience store. 
The caller stated he had been 
robbed at gunpoint in his home 
where he had a marihuana grow operation. The 
caller provided his address and hung up, but the 
police were unable to renew telephone contact 
with the caller. Several police officers attended 
the home and grouped at the front door. The 
area was quiet and there was no external 
evidence of criminal activity or a marihuana grow 
operation. 
 
Police knocked loudly at the door, but received 
no answer despite hearing a male voice inside. 
Further knocking and ringing of the doorbell 
resulted in a male voice stating, “Who is it?” An 
officer said it was the police and asked the 
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occupant to open the door. The male said, “What 
do you want?” The officer again knocked, told 
the occupant it was the police, and asked him to 
open the door. The officer could see a male 
standing in the hall as he looked through the mail 
slot. Again the officer told the occupant to open 
the door. After about 30 seconds, the door 
opened and the odour of growing marihuana was 
immediately evident. The occupant was 
handcuffed and police entered the house. Two 
other adults and one child were found in the 
home, but there were no guns or evidence of a 
robbery. However, the police did note that the 
house had been converted into a marihuana grow 
operations with some space reserved for living 
quarters. Police applied for and were granted a 
search warrant to search the house. 
 
During a trial voire dire in British Columbia 
Provincial Court, the accused challenged the 
validity of the warrant, among other things, 
arguing the information contained in it was 
obtained through a warrantless search that 
violated their Charter rights to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure. The 
accused submitted that the police should have 
considered that the 911 call was a hoax, 
perpetrated on the occupants of the home. If 
the police would have considered the 911 a hoax, 
the accused contended the police would have 
taken other action. 
 
In ruling that the police action in entering the 
house to search for injured persons was 
reasonable and did not violate the accused’s 
rights under s.8 of the Charter, Justice Schmidt 
stated: 
 
The court is not satisfied that the police 
acted inappropriately in this circumstance. The 
police responded to a high priority call of a 
robbery at gunpoint in a private residence by a 
person who said he was the occupant of the 
residence. The person revealed that he was 
growing marihuana in his home and gave the 
address for the police to attend. When the 
occupants refused to answer the door after 
the police announced their presence, the 
person in the residence created a sense of 
urgency and appeared to verify the 
information received by the police in the 911 
call. The best information the police had was 
that the owner / occupier of the house was 
not in the house, but that a robbery was in 
progress. The failure of the person inside to 
open the door or to hesitate to open the door 
added credibility to the 911 call. 
 
At that point, the options for the police were 
severely limited. There may be a number of 
scenarios which would account for the facts as 
they presented themselves, but it was a 
sensible conclusion that the report was 
accurate. Perhaps the caller occupant had 
escaped, run to the nearby payphone, made the 
call and in his panic had forgotten to leave his 
name and ran off after other assistance, 
leaving his family alone with the armed 
intruders. The refusal of the male person 
inside the house to open the door tended to 
confirm some such scenario and required the 
police to perform their duty as peace officers 
and determine the facts without further delay 
and in a manner that reflected the report they 
received. 
 
There was no fact or circumstance observable 
by the officers that would move them to 
believe that they were dealing with any 
situation other than the one that had been 
reported to them. In fact, they have a growing 
familiarity with armed robberies of private 
residences used for growing marihuana that 
unfold much as this one appeared to be 
unfolding. 
 
The fact that the house did not appear to be a 
grow operation is not persuasive and is not 
something that should cause the police to 
treat a 911 call less urgently. Criminals with 
sophisticated methods appear to have 
increasingly occupied the field, and grow 
operations are no longer clumsy attempts to 
produce for personal use or minor profit. They 
are often businesses that have adapted to the 
adverse business climate of illegality and their 
operations are difficult or impossible to 
detect. No one is more aware of this than the 
police and the lack of condensation on windows 
and other historical indicia of marihuana grow 
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operations inside a residence are not factors 
that should have caused the police to doubt 
the veracity of the call. 
 
The police were not required in these 
circumstances to attempt to locate the caller 
at the payphone beyond the efforts made by 
their dispatchers to call back to the payphone 
and re-establish the connection…. [paras. 23-
27] 
 
And further: 
 
Where, as in the case at bar, the police are 
unable to verify whether the person behind 
the door is the occupant and are unable to 
verify the circumstances of the persons inside 
the house after receiving a call involving the 
possible use of firearms, they have a duty to 
act in a manner most consistent with a 
response to an emergency. [para. 31] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
TASER TOUCH DID NOT 
BREACH CHARTER RIGHTS 
R. v. Eriksson, 2004 BCPC 34 
 
In the early morning hours a 
citizen saw a car off the road in 
a snow bank. He noted the 
accused smelled of liquor, 
seemed under the influence of 
alcohol, and became angry and yelled at him and 
the tow truck operator before police arrived. A 
police officer attended and began an impaired 
driving investigation after noting the smell of 
alcohol on the accused’s breath and other indicia 
of impairment. She was arrested, given the 
breath demand, and advised of her Charter 
rights. The accused declined to give a breath 
sample at the time, asked for a 24 hour driving 
suspension, and declined to speak with a lawyer.  
 
The accused was transported back to the police 
station and the booking-in process began. She 
was very loud, “almost confrontational”, and again 
refused to speak with a lawyer. The police 
learned the accused was on an undertaking to 
abstain from alcohol; she was arrested for 
breach and again refused to talk with counsel. 
The accused became vocal, yelling and screaming, 
using profanity, and calling police derogatory 
names when she was about to placed in a cell.  
 
A female member was called to assist in 
removing her personal possessions and searching 
her, but the accused refused to cooperate. 
What occurred next was described by the trial 
judge as follows: 
 
Cst. Millar asked the Accused to remove her 
jewellery. At first the Accused refused and 
swore at Cst. Millar at which point Cst. Millar 
advised the Accused that if she did not 
remove the jewellery force would be used to 
remove those items. The Accused took off one 
earring and punched it into Cst. Millar's hand 
striking the constable's hand with her hand 
and causing the earring to fall to the floor. 
The Accused then refused to remove any more 
jewellery and continued verbally assailing Cst. 
Millar. 
 
Cst. Clark stepped forward at that point and 
without any warning touched the Accused with 
a TASER on her left side. The Accused "jolted 
back" and said "that fucking hurt" but then 
became compliant and removed the rest of her 
jewellery and provided it to Cst. Millar. [para. 
12-13] 
 
The accused was searched and placed in cells. No 
medical treatment was provided by the police 
nor did the accused seek any medical treatment 
after being released. She said she hurt for a 
month and she suffered bruising and breaking of 
the skin.  
 
In the midst of her trial  in British Columbia 
Provincial Court on charges of impaired driving 
and breach of undertaking, the accused sought a 
judicial stay of proceedings, submitting the 
actions of the police while she was in custody 
violated her Charter rights, including s.7—the 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person. 
The trial judge summarized the accused’s 
arguments as follows: 
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(a) there was no concern by any of the police 
officers that the Accused might assault one of 
them; 
(b) there is no evidence of Cst. Clark's 
motivation for using the TASER as he was not 
called as a witness; 
(c) although the Accused was unquestionably 
loud and unpleasant the booking-in process was 
proceeding by the officers who had duties in 
that regard; and 
(d) Cst. Clark had no role in the arrest of or 
the booking-in procedure concerning the 
Accused and his use of the TASER was a case 
of extra-judicial punishment and a completely 
unneeded and unacceptable use of force in the 
circumstances. 
 
The Crown contended that the Criminal Code—
s.25—permits “a peace officer to use whatever 
force is necessary to do what they are required 
or authorized to do provided they act on 
reasonable grounds and the force used is not 
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm.” 
Even if the force was excessive and its use 
breached the accused’s s.7 rights, the Crown 
also suggested there was no link between the 
breach and trial fairness that would justify a 
judicial stay of proceedings.  
 
The trial judge also added s.12 of the Charter—
the right not to be subjected to any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment—to the 
discussion even though the defence did not 
refer to it in their stay application. However, 
Justice Brechnell concluded the police did not 
breach the accused’s Charter rights in this case. 
The judge ruled: 
 
The Accused claims that the application of the 
TASER by Cst. Clark without warning and in 
circumstances where she was not threatening 
the other police officers in the booking room 
area amounted to excessive force and extra 
judicial punishment and thus infringed upon 
her Charter rights. 
 
It is clear that Cst. Clark gave no warning prior 
to administering the TASER to the Accused. 
However, one must examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the use of the 
TASER in coming to any conclusions as to 
whether or not its use amounted to an 
infringement of the Accused's Charter rights. 
 
The Accused was being vocally abusive and 
belligerent to Constables McSeveney and 
Millar. The Accused was being uncooperative in 
response to Cst. Millar's requests to remove 
her jewellery. The Accused struck Cst. Millar's 
hand with her hand in an obvious show of 
defiance and with sufficient force to cause 
the Accused's earring to fall to the floor. This 
action followed Cst. Millar's verbal warning to 
the Accused indicating that if she did not 
cooperate in the removal of her jewellery 
additional measures would be taken by the 
police to ensure the jewellery was removed. 
She did receive a warning that there would be 
consequences to follow from further non-
compliance with Cst. Millar's requests. 
 
The use of the TASER in the booking room 
area is third on the continuum of methods of 
control enunciated by Cst. McSeveney as RCMP 
policy. The Accused had failed to comply with 
verbal requests and had acted in a physically 
aggressive manner towards Cst. Millar. It is 
not necessary for the police in such 
circumstances to become involved in a full 
blown physical altercation with a person in 
their charge when another acceptable method 
of ensuring compliance is immediately at hand 
and can be deployed in a manner that minimizes 
any physical danger to the attending members 
and the Accused while at the same time 
encouraging immediate compliance. 
 
By applying the TASER to the Accused Cst. 
Clark's actions can be justified as the use of 
as much force as is necessary for the purpose 
of controlling the Accused and ensuring her 
compliance. 
 
Although Cst. Clark's actions in applying the 
TASER to the Accused were taken without any 
request from Constables McSeveney and Millar 
and done without an additional warning to the 
Accused that the TASER would be used they 
do not amount any violation of the Accused's 
Section 7 or indeed Section 12 Charter rights 
in the circumstances of this case and no relief 
is available to her. [paras. 66-71] 
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The judge also noted that even if there was a 
violation of the accused’s Charter rights, a 
judicial stay was not an appropriate remedy—her 
ability to make full answer and defence, the 
investigation of the charges, nor the conduct of 
the trial were affected by the police action. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
POLICE NOT REQUIRED TO 
‘COCOON’ THEMSELVES ON 
APPROACH TO HOUSE 
R. v. Vu & Vu, 2004 BCCA 381 
 
Two major crime unit police 
officers went to the accused’s 
home to return some property 
seized during a previous drug 
investigation 3 years earlier. 
They parked at the rear of the house and went 
to the back door, knocked, but received no 
response. An officer walked along the house to 
the front to look for another door, but did not 
find one. Walking back to the police car, he saw a 
doorway made of wooden slats, with one slat 
missing. He detected a very strong odour of 
marihuana, looked inside, and saw a garden hose 
and water bottles. He also examined a lower 
floor level window and saw it had a covering on it.  
The police obtained a search warrant under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and found 
two rooms containing 159 marihuana plants.  
 
At trial the accused argued that the search 
warrant was based on information unlawfully 
obtained. They submitted that the police really 
went to the property to investigate a marihuana 
operation, rather than to return property. 
Further, even if the officer did not have a 
secondary purpose, his walk down the driveway 
after knocking was unlawful and therefore he 
smelled the marihuana illegally.  
 
Justice Taylor, describing the detection of the 
marihuana odour as happenstance, rejected the 
accused’s arguments. In his view, the police had 
one intention when they attended—to return 
property—and the officer was not expected “to 
collapse his antennas and cocoon himself in the 
reality of that which he observes as he passes 
through each day.” The accused were convicted 
of production of a controlled substance and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
 
The accused appealed their convictions to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in concluding that the 
search of the residence was lawful. Although 
they conceded the police had an implied licence 
to knock on the door, they argued it was revoked 
once the police received no answer. In other 
words, the officers’ right to remain on the 
property had ended and any further evidence 
obtained was unlawful, which tainted the 
warrant. Justice Oppal, authoring the unanimous 
British Columbia Court of Appeal judgment 
upheld the trial court’s ruling. He stated: 
 
…There is no doubt that the police conduct in 
this case was somewhat unusual, to say the 
least: the police took the extraordinary 
measure of having officers in a Major Crime 
Unit personally return an exhibit that had 
been seized from Mrs. Vu some three years 
prior to this incident.  Notwithstanding this, 
the trial judge found that the police were 
acting in a bona fide manner when they went to 
the Vu residence.  He found as a fact that 
they had but one intention: to return an 
exhibit that had been seized earlier.  It is of 
course not for this Court to interfere with 
those findings of fact. [para. 24] 
 
Complete copy available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 
FOLLOWING DETENTION 
INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Dolynchuk, 2004 MBCA 45 
 
Two police officers responded 
to a report of a vehicle being 
driven erratically by a single 
male occupant who was slouched 
to the side with his eyes closed. A licence 
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number of the vehicle was provided, but the 
vehicle was not located in the area. The police 
attended the registered owner’s address at an 
apartment building. As they were backing up in 
the parking lot, the officers noted a SUV 
matching the suspect vehicle description and 
bearing the same licence plate number pulling in 
the parking lot. They did not see the driver, but 
saw a male coming from between two parked 
cars. They asked the accused his name, which he 
provided. It was the same as the registered 
owner of the SUV.  The accused was staggering, 
unable to balance himself, smelled of alcohol, had 
bloodshot eyes, slow responses, and still held the 
vehicle keys in his hand. An officer then asked 
the accused if he had just got home after 
driving his vehicle—to which the accused 
responded in the affirmative. The accused was 
then arrested, Chartered, cautioned, and read 
the breathalyzer demand.  
 
At his trial the accused successfully argued he 
had been arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the 
Charter and that his s.10(b) Charter rights had 
been violated because the police did not advise 
him of the right to counsel before questioning 
him. His admission of driving was excluded and 
the impaired driving charge was dismissed. The 
Crown unsuccessfully appealed to the Manitoba 
Court of Queen’s Bench, which upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling. The Crown again appealed to the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal. 
 
In dismissing the Crown appeal, all three justices 
agreed there had been a psychological detention 
when the officer asked the accused if he had 
been driving and therefore his right to counsel 
under s.10(b) had been triggered. A psychological 
detention occurs when an officer makes a 
demand of a person and the person reasonably 
believes there is no choice but to comply with 
the demand. Even if an accused does not testify, 
as was the case here, the court can nonetheless 
conclude a reasonable belief to comply with a 
demand since the test is objective. “All of the 
words and conduct of the participants, as well as 
the environment in which questioning took place” 
must be examined to distinguish a demand from 
a request or what is compulsory from what is 
voluntary. In concluding that there was a 
detention, Justice Steele wrote: 
 
In the case at bar, the police had knowledge 
that an offence may have been committed. 
They knew that a witness had seen the 
particular motor vehicle in question being 
driven erratically quite recently. They knew 
that this man who had emerged from around 
the motor vehicle in question was the 
registered owner, that he was staggering, 
smelled of alcohol and had blood-shot eyes. 
They had already formed the opinion that the 
accused was noticeably impaired and that 
should he refuse to answer their questions, 
they would not allow him to leave. They were 
asking questions of him as part of a specific 
investigation. The positive answer to the police 
question "Were you driving?" basically gave the 
police proof of the final element in the 
offence of impaired driving. The uniformed 
police officers were not questioning him at 
random on the street, but in the parking lot of 
his apartment complex. These factors may 
support an inference by the trial court that 
the accused could reasonably have concluded 
that his freedom had been restrained. In 
these cases, the courts are not developing a 
concept of what has been referred to as 
"constructive detention," but rather are 
looking to surrounding circumstances to 
determine whether a reasonable person would 
consider themselves detained. 
 
I hasten to add that the question itself, 
"Were you driving?," would not necessarily lead 
to a conclusion that the accused was detained 
in every circumstance in which it was asked by 
a police officer of a driver…. 
 
In this case, the police officers had much 
more than a suspicion that [the accused] had 
just been driving the motor vehicle in question 
and that he was impaired. The Crown 
acknowledges that [the constable’s] testimony 
is clear that he "would have detained for 
investigative purposes" once he determined 
that he was speaking to [the accused], the 
registered owner. While this was never 
communicated to the accused and therefore 
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cannot be determinative of the issue of 
psychological detention, it is reflective of the 
environment in which the question was put and 
one factor among several to be considered 
when deciding whether the inference can be 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances. 
 
Police purpose and motive can be taken into 
account as a factor when determining whether 
there is sufficient evidence from which a 
court can infer compulsion. The overall 
situation must be evaluated having regard to 
what is said and done, in what manner, in what 
location and for what purpose. [paras. 24-27] 
 
And further: 
 
…This was not a random encounter or a general 
investigation. It was a specific investigation 
with respect to impaired driving and this 
particular motor vehicle. Given the description 
the civilian witness gave of the driver and the 
opinion the police officers formed of the 
degree of impairment of the accused when 
they saw him, they had reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused had committed the 
crime being investigated, perhaps even to 
arrest him. By the testimony of the police 
officers themselves, the investigation had 
reached the stage where they had already 
decided that a crime had been committed and 
that the accused was the perpetrator or 
involved in its commission. In that context, the 
question as to whether he had just been 
driving his vehicle was not of a general nature 
to obtain information, but rather was for the 
purpose of obtaining incriminating statements 
from the accused. 
 
One last point. This case was argued on the 
basis that if a detention existed, the accused 
should have been provided his s. 10(b) Charter 
rights. In this case, I agree with the trial 
judge and the summary conviction appeal judge 
that he should have been given his right to 
counsel information after the first question 
and answer and before the second question. 
There is no reason in this case that could not 
have been done even though we are speaking of 
a detention of only a minute or two. 
 
I leave open the question of whether a s. 10(b) 
right arises in all cases of detention. I can 
envision a situation where because of safety 
concerns, a search incidental to detention is 
required before an individual is given their 
right to counsel information. There may be 
other examples. There may be situations 
where delay of the accused's s. 10(b) rights is 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter. These 
points were not fully argued in front of us and 
should be left for a subsequent case. [paras. 
32-34] 
 
As for the s.24(2) Charter analysis—the 
admissibility of evidence—the court was divided. 
Justice Steele, with Justice Hamilton 
concurring, ruled the evidence inadmissible. 
Justice Steele wrote: 
 
In the case at bar, the accused was detained. 
The Charter breach resulted in the accused's 
participation in the creation of self-
incriminating evidence in a situation where the 
evidence indicates he might very well have 
taken advantage of his s. 10(b) rights. Even 
though a statement may not literally have been 
compelled from the accused by force or 
trickery, it would still render a trial unfair to 
admit a statement that incriminates the 
accused when he has not had the opportunity 
to be advised of his legal right to remain silent 
in circumstances where he is entitled to that 
right. [para. 72] 
 
Justice Huband, on the other hand, would have 
admitted the evidence even though it might be 
categorized as conscriptive. Justice Huband 
stated: 
 
In the circumstances of this case, it is my view 
that the admission of the evidence would not 
result in unfairness of the proceeding. 
 
Turning to other matters that will influence 
the decision on admissibility, I think it is 
obvious that the alleged violation of law was 
serious in nature. The accused's motor vehicle 
was identified as being driven in a manner 
which constituted a significant danger to other 
users of the highway. This was no trifling 
momentary incident. It is the public interest 
that offenders be apprehended and suitably 
punished, and it is equally important that 
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potential offenders be mindful of the 
consequences of driving while impaired. 
 
What would a reasonable and informed 
observer conclude upon learning that the 
accused's admission was admitted as evidence 
in his trial, leading ineluctably to his 
conviction? He or she would consider the 
circumstances leading to the momentary 
detention, the good faith of the police 
officers and the less than serious nature of 
the Charter breach. Given the circumstances, 
I do not think that the observer would be 
shocked or appalled. I do not think he or she 
would conclude that the criminal justice 
system was in any way corrupted. Without 
passing too long over the ambiguities inherent 
in the phrase "bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute," I do not think that our 
reasonable and informed observer would 
conclude that disrepute of the administration 
of justice would result from the admission of 
this evidence in these proceedings. [para. 94-
96] 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DID YOU KNOW… 
 
…that Statistics Canada recently released its 
crime statistics for Canada’s 27 Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). The top 10 in each 
category are:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 CMA Top Ten Homicide Rates 
(per 100,000 residents) 
Abbotsford 5.1 
Regina 5.1 
Kingston 3.3. 
Saskatoon 3.3 
Windsor 2.7 
Winnipeg 2.6 
Edmonton 2.2 
Vancouver 2.1 
Toronto 1.9 
London 1.7 
 
2003 CMA Top Ten Motor Vehicle Theft Rates (per 
100,000 residents) 
Abbotsford 1,580 
Winnipeg 1,493 
Regina 1,355 
Vancouver 1,261 
Edmonton 951 
Saskatoon 744 
Hamilton 740 
Montreal 659 
Sherbrooke 648 
London 586 
 
2003 CMA Top Ten Break-in Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Saskatoon 2,083 
Regina 2,071 
Vancouver 1,350 
Abbotsford 1,335 
Winnipeg 1,162 
Sherbrooke 1,107 
Gatineau 1,061 
Edmonton 1,020 
Thunder Bay 1,000 
Sudbury 992 
 
2003 CMA Top Ten Robbery Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Saskatoon 306 
Winnipeg 235 
Regina 230 
Edmonton 162 
Montreal 158 
Vancouver 153 
Halifax 141 
Calgary 116 
Abbotsford 114 
Toronto  112 
 
For a complete copy of Statistic’s Canada report, 
see The Daily, Wednesday July 28, 2004, 
available online at www.statcan.ca 
 
2003 CMA Top Ten Crime Rates  
(per 100,000 residents) 
Saskatoon 15,164 
Regina 15,143 
Abbotsford 13,356 
Winnipeg 11,864 
Vancouver 11,576 
Edmonton 10,969 
Victoria 10,588 
Halifax 9,324 
Thunder Bay 8,533 
Montreal 7,938 
